

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION



45th PLENARY MEETING

Monday, 1 November 1993

at 10 a.m.

Official Records

NEW YORK

*President: Mr. INSANALLY
(Guyana)*

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 14

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

- (a) NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE
AGENCY (A/48/341)
- (b) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/48/L.13 and Corr.1)

The PRESIDENT: I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed today at 11 a.m.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I therefore request those representatives wishing to participate in the debate to inscribe their names on the list as soon as possible.

I am now pleased to invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, to present the Agency's report for the year 1992.

Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency): Almost 40 years ago, in a speech to the General Assembly in December 1953, President Eisenhower launched the "Atoms for Peace" initiative, one feature of which was the creation of an international agency to

"devise methods whereby ... fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 470th meeting, para. 118*)

It is to the "Atoms for Peace" initiative that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) owes its birth as well its mandate to seek to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity, while time guarding against its use for military purposes.

The twin challenges thus described remain, but in a radically changed world. In my statement to the General Assembly last year I noted that we are at last moving into a world in which fewer resources will be used for military purposes, including nuclear arsenals. Even though many new and serious problems face mankind - for instance, environmental threats - we seem to stand on the threshold of an era in which "Atoms for Peace" can at last achieve its full meaning: an era in which many nuclear techniques may be disseminated, especially for the benefit of the developing world; an era in which a wider use of nuclear power may help to reduce some of the environmental threats to mankind; an era in which we may even begin to think seriously about how to organize a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Let me develop these themes. The objective of sustainable development was endorsed by the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, and outlined in Agenda 21. Nuclear techniques have much to contribute to this objective. The IAEA, as the central intergovernmental mechanism in the nuclear sphere, can play an important role - and not only in the areas of safe generation of energy and the safe disposal of radioactive waste. It can also facilitate the transfer of nuclear

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techniques to promote health, to ensure greater availability of fresh water and to secure important data on the atmosphere and the seas.

The IAEA is the only organization in the United Nations system operating its own laboratories, which have research and analytical capabilities that can be used - and are used - for environmental protection and sustainable development. Thus our laboratory in Seibersdorf, outside Vienna, is helping institutes in Africa to use nuclear techniques for conducting element analysis in air, water, soil and biological samples. Our Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco, *inter alia*, supports and helps marine laboratories in developing countries by providing expertise and training. This work forms an integral part of the Oceans and Coastal Areas Programme of the United Nations Environment Programme.

Agenda 21 recognizes that although energy is vital for growth, its generation and use can be sources of environmental degradation. The Agenda therefore calls for the design and implementation of environmentally sound energy strategies. This task will not be an easy one. All forms of energy generation and use entail some risks to health and to the environment. We shall need to aim at a mix of energy sources and ways of using them that minimize these risks. In the context of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Governments are now starting to make commitments to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions, which are linked to the uses of all fossil fuels. However, we are still far from formulating national and international energy policies that take into account all the implications of various energy choices.

To start with, we need more hard data about these implications. To obtain such data, the IAEA has for some years been engaged with other organizations in a project on databases and methodologies for the comparative assessment of the health and environmental consequences of different ways of generating electricity. The IAEA also contributes towards the process in which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is assessing the potential of nuclear power for mitigating greenhouse emissions. It is worth noting that most of the scenarios for future energy policies which lead to substantial reductions in global carbon-dioxide emissions contain a significant component of nuclear power.

Agenda 21 devotes a whole chapter to the environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes, reflecting the importance which the international community attaches to this issue. Agenda 21 encourages support for the IAEA's activities in this regard, especially in strengthening the capacity of developing countries in the field of sound nuclear-waste management. Much is being

done within the IAEA to promote safe disposal of nuclear wastes - for instance, information exchange, expert assistance, advice and services in specific cases and work on establishing international norms. While non-binding radioactive-waste safety standards already exist, work is expected before long on a binding convention on the safe management and disposal of radioactive wastes.

Let me also mention in this connection that under the so-called London Dumping Convention the IAEA provides the technical basis for norms relating to the disposal of radioactive materials at sea. A moratorium on such disposal was recommended in 1985, and next month the Contracting Parties to the Convention will take a decision on whether to replace that moratorium with a complete ban.

As is well known, some sea disposal of radioactive waste has occurred despite the recommended moratorium and has caused concern. During 1992 and 1993 the IAEA took various initiatives to evaluate the potential impact of and possible remedial action with regard to radioactive-waste dumping in the Kara and Barents Seas. In cooperation with the Governments of Russia and Norway, the Agency, through its Monaco Marine Laboratory, took part in the sea expeditions organized by these two countries. An analysis of the environmental samples collected to date indicates that the present levels of radioactivity in the area of the dump sites are low. As a follow-up, the Agency initiated the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project to make a full evaluation of the possible health and environmental impact of radioactive wastes dumped in the shallow waters of the Arctic. The IAEA has declared that it is also ready to help assess the potential impact of the radioactive waste dumped in the North Pacific, including the Sea of Japan. The latest of these dumping actions took place very recently.

I should like to turn now to the safety of nuclear power. The efforts of the IAEA to develop not only recommendations but legally binding safety standards for nuclear-power plants have continued. I am glad to report to the Assembly that there is now a consensus about the structure and main contents of a nuclear safety convention. The scope of the convention would be limited to civil nuclear-power reactors. An important feature would be an obligation of the parties to report at agreed intervals to a meeting of contracting parties on the national application of safety principles laid down in the convention. That reporting would be linked to a system of international peer review. It is hoped that the convention will be approved within the next year.

The IAEA continues to assist in seeking to mitigate the consequences of the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. It

participates in the Inter-Agency Task Force established by the United Nations under the chairmanship of Under-Secretary-General Eliasson. One very successful project has been to give cattle in the area affected by the nuclear fall-out from the Chernobyl accident a compound called Prussian blue, which radically and safely reduces radio-caesium contamination in meat and in milk. In addition, since the accident - and as a result of far-reaching changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - major efforts are under way to upgrade the safety of nuclear installations in this region. Assistance is offered by the G-24 Group of countries members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), by the Commission of the European Communities and by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. The IAEA focuses its assistance on implementing consistent international safety assessments and on making recommendations regarding the most urgently needed safety improvements. Some improvements in the safety of these facilities are now achieved as a result of the considerable work undertaken by all concerned - mostly, of course, by the countries in the region themselves.

In conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the IAEA has taken a further initiative to strengthen radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures in the States of the former Soviet Union.

I should now like to discuss how the IAEA can meet several new challenges it may be asked to take on in the field of security in the post-cold-war period.

In his message to the thirty-seventh General Conference of the IAEA the Secretary-General noted that, although the post-cold-war world is in some respects a safer one, it is also considerably more complicated. There could be a development that eventually leads all nations to do away with nuclear weapons, but there are also some new risks for a development in the opposite direction, that is to say, a spread of such weapons to further countries. The most important measures to prevent horizontal proliferation lie in the fields of security policy, in the creation of international and regional relations such that the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons disappears. It is, further, of crucial importance that the renunciation of nuclear weapons by each State be reliable. If it is not so perceived, there may remain incentives for other States to acquire such weapons. It is to give the greatest possible assurance that non-proliferation commitments are respected and reliable that IAEA verification safeguards are demanded and accepted by non-nuclear-weapon States.

In a world of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a world of fewer nuclear weapons, there

is need to feel confident both that non-nuclear-weapon States are not violating their non-proliferation commitments and that States legally committed to dismantle nuclear weapons do not secretly produce new weapons. The key to confidence-building is full nuclear transparency. The IAEA safeguards, particularly when applied to a State's complete nuclear-fuel cycle, are an instrument to create such transparency. Not surprisingly, considering the political and security significance of the reliability of non-proliferation commitments, some of the Agency's safeguards and verification activities have been at the forefront of political and media attention during the past year. I shall describe these activities in a moment. However, no rational assessment of the Agency's safeguards system or activities is possible without a realistic understanding of what they can and cannot do.

Safeguards inspectors are not a supranational police force that can parachute into a country and stop proliferation. They are inspectors who verify the correctness and completeness of State declarations about nuclear material and installations. Their reports, if reassuring, may create confidence and détente. If alarming, they may trigger action by the international community. Power to take collective action - diplomatic, economic or military - is vested in the Security Council, and it is to that body, in accordance with its Statute and its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations, that the IAEA will have to turn if its safeguards verifications point to acts of proliferation or if there is non-compliance with safeguards obligations.

The revelations about Iraq's undeclared nuclear activities highlighted the fact that in practice safeguards activities had been limited to declared nuclear material and declared installations. Following the experience of Iraq, the international community also looks for assurance about the non-existence of undeclared nuclear material and installations in States that have comprehensive safeguards. It looks to the IAEA safeguards to provide such assurance, in so far as it is possible. This has led to considerable efforts in the IAEA to strengthen the Agency's capacity to detect nuclear material and installations that should have been, but were not, declared.

Inspectors cannot go in blind search of undeclared nuclear material and installations. They must have information about where to go and what to ask. The single most important factor for building a capacity to find possibly existing non-declared material and installations is for the Agency to have access to information. Accordingly, measures are taken to strengthen the Agency's information base - for instance, regarding exports and imports of nuclear material and relevant equipment. However, all available safeguards-relevant

information must be scrutinized and analysed critically. There exists much erroneous information, and the Agency must seek to avoid false alarms. It is obvious that the more thorough and comprehensive the Agency's verification activities are, the more confidence and assurances they can provide. Fortunately, several new techniques and approaches, such as environmental monitoring, are emerging that may be used to give safeguards the greater detection capacity now asked for. These techniques and approaches will need to be tested, assessed thoroughly and accepted before they can be broadly used and relied on.

The central safeguards issue relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is that IAEA verification activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suggest that some nuclear material exists there which has not been reported to the Agency. Hence, the Agency cannot verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's report of material subject to safeguards. The Agency has not asserted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is diverting nuclear material for weapons development. However, until such time as the inconsistency between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's report and the Agency's findings is satisfactorily resolved through additional information and visits to additional locations, the possibility that nuclear material has been diverted cannot be excluded.

One would expect that a Government faced with questions relevant to safeguards implementation would go out of its way promptly to provide the IAEA with clarification. Regrettably, so far, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has instead been seeking to restrict IAEA safeguards verification, thereby reducing transparency. Thus, the area of non-compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has been widening. As a result, a number of verification measures of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declared nuclear activities have become overdue and the continuity of some safeguards-relevant data has been damaged.

The longer the Agency is precluded from conducting inspection, the more safeguards-related data deteriorate and the less assurance safeguards can provide that even the declared facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. For its part, the Agency is ready to conduct inspection of the nuclear installations and material which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has declared and submitted to safeguards. However, the inspection activities are an integral whole. They are not a set of activities from which an inspected State can pick and choose. The Agency is also ready to consult with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on all outstanding

safeguards issues, including the question of the inspection of non-declared sites and additional information.

To conclude my comments on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, only the practice of full nuclear transparency, including full implementation of IAEA safeguards, can create the confidence that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear activities are devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

When a State joining the safeguards system has many nuclear installations and much nuclear material, it is always difficult to verify that everything has been declared. However, the Agency's activities in South Africa show that such difficulties can be successfully tackled through the sustained efforts of the IAEA and a high degree of cooperation and transparency by the inspected party. Since September 1991, when South Africa concluded its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, 22 IAEA safeguards missions have visited South Africa. Many apparent discrepancies and inconsistencies which were earlier identified have been resolved. No reason has been found to doubt the veracity of South Africa's initial declaration.

A new dimension was added when President De Klerk declared that South Africa had developed a nuclear-weapons capability but had destroyed it totally before acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agency was invited to examine that the programme had in fact been terminated and that all the nuclear material had been placed under safeguards. A team of Agency staff and nuclear-weapons experts visited South Africa for these purposes in April, June and August this year. It found no indication casting doubt on South Africa's statement that all the highly enriched uranium from weapons had been reported in its initial declaration.

For the past two and a half years, the IAEA has devoted much effort to fulfilling the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 687 (1991) relating to Iraq. Some 21 inspection missions sent by the IAEA and considerable staff work in Vienna have enabled us to conclude that, in all essential aspects, Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme has been mapped and either destroyed or neutralized. Declared, non-irradiated highly enriched uranium was removed from Iraq in November 1991 and a schedule has been established for the removal of declared, irradiated highly enriched uranium. When this activity is complete, no highly enriched uranium and no capacity to produce it should remain in Iraq.

There are still some gaps in our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear supply and procurement channels and about

sources of scientific and technical information. We hope that, on the basis of documentation very recently made available by Iraq, the last pieces of this picture will soon be clarified in a way which will contribute towards full and effective long-term monitoring. This will be essential to give assurance that Iraq does not seek to reacquire proscribed nuclear capability. In recent discussions in New York with the Iraqi side, the IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission have clarified how ongoing monitoring and verification are to be pursued. Such monitoring will not, of course, preclude the Agency from using the extensive rights of inspection in Iraq approved by the Security Council, should it need to do so.

On the basis of preparations carried out over the past year, the Agency has phased in, on a *de facto* basis, certain elements of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan provided for in Security Council resolution 715 (1991), a mandatory resolution that is automatically binding on all Member States. The approach which has been followed will allow the Agency to move into full and formal implementation of the plan at an early stage and thus accelerate the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, in so far as they relate to Iraq's nuclear capacity.

However, as I reported recently to the Security Council, before the IAEA can report that, in its view, Iraq has complied with the requirements of paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of section C of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq must formally acknowledge its obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and the plan approved thereunder, and the IAEA must satisfy itself that it is in a position fully to implement the plan. The IAEA must also verify to its satisfaction recent information provided by Iraq on suppliers.

I will now touch on some areas in which we can be sure that IAEA safeguards activities will expand and on some others where such expansion is possible. A good example of mutual openness and confidence-building in nuclear activities has been set by Argentina and Brazil. Increasing cooperation in the nuclear sphere between the two countries over the past decade culminated in 1991 in the Guadalajara Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy. This Agreement was supplemented by a quadripartite safeguards agreement which was signed in Vienna in December 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA.

Under this latter agreement, comprehensive IAEA safeguards will be implemented in the two countries. I am pleased to note that the Argentine parliament approved the

safeguards agreement last year, and the Lower House of the Brazilian Congress has recently approved it. The application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards will by no means raise any obstacles to peaceful nuclear development in the two countries. Rather, it is likely to remove some obstacles to wider international cooperation.

It could also soon lead to the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Latin America's becoming effectively a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be a major event, and would strengthen nuclear non-proliferation efforts generally.

I have already spoken about the Agency's verification activities in South Africa. The positive developments in South Africa may also lead to the conclusion of a Treaty making the whole African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Agency is working closely with the United Nations-Organization of African Unity Group of Experts entrusted with the drafting of an African nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty.

In the Middle East, the peace process has passed a difficult hurdle. If the process accelerates, the prospects for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction may increase. Support by the parties to the peace process for the concept of such a zone is firm.

Against the background of the many past conflicts and the deep distrust between the parties in the Middle East, there is naturally much interest in considering how, and by what means, effective verification of a nuclear-weapon-free zone can be achieved and how guarantees can be created for early warning of any violations, should they occur. There appears to be a general understanding, between the regional parties, of the need for comprehensive and far-reaching verification in a future nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Another important confidence-building measure would be the development of active cooperation between the parties, in the nuclear field, in an open and transparent manner.

In pursuance of a mandate placed upon me by a resolution of the IAEA's General Conference, I have been consulting States of the Middle East region with a view, *inter alia*, to facilitating the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in that region. In a further resolution, the General Conference added the request that the Director General should provide whatever assistance might be requested by the parties in the Middle East in support of the multilateral efforts of the peace process. I shall certainly respond to any such request.

In his statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 27 September this year, President Clinton spoke about steps to control the materials needed for nuclear weapons production, to address issues related to growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and to encourage all nuclear weapon States to refrain from nuclear testing and to begin negotiations towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In areas such as these, roles may be assigned to the IAEA which, while consistent with its mandate, would go beyond its traditional safeguards functions.

Current nuclear disarmament measures, as well as current reprocessing of spent civilian nuclear fuel, will lead to substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium - that is to say, materials usable for nuclear weapons - which will have to be safely and securely stored before they are put to peaceful use or otherwise disposed of. Concerns about the safety and security of such materials might be alleviated by devising specific confidence-building measures which States could enter into either unilaterally or multilaterally. The IAEA has initiated some preliminary work in seeking to identify some of the problems and possible methods for managing plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

A verified cut-off for the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons or other explosive purposes has been under international discussion for many years. However, the present international climate gives grounds for hope that that discussion could lead to an agreement involving all States on an equal basis. The verification arrangements needed to underpin such an agreement would entail great challenges, having necessarily to focus on the largest and most complex of nuclear installations, that is to say, enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Methods and techniques of verification exist, but might have to be further developed. Should IAEA safeguards be applied to the operation or dismantling of all installations capable of producing weapons-usable material, the added verification workload - and the resources needed for it - would be significant. The value of a cut-off agreement would also be very significant.

Among the arms control measures now under discussion is an agreement on a complete ban on any kind of nuclear explosive testing. It has been suggested that the IAEA might be given a central role in verifying compliance with such agreement, including the management of an international data centre and the conduct of on-site inspections. The Agency has some experience and expertise in the field of seismic measurements, the main verification method under consideration, as well as in

other relevant areas. I am confident that, with some added capacity, the IAEA would be able to perform verification tasks under a test-ban treaty, if entrusted with so doing.

The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, in 1995, will also mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT continues to provide a solid framework for global nuclear non-proliferation endeavours, side by side with the other multilateral treaties on the subject.

In the presidential statement made at the Summit Meeting of 31 January 1992, the Security Council emphasized, *inter alia*, the integral role of effective IAEA safeguards in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. There is little doubt that the most important contributions which the Agency can make to the NPT are to continue to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of the safeguards applied under the Treaty, to continue to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as prescribed by the Treaty, and to extend safeguards effectively to the new Parties to the Treaty.

In anticipation of the adherence of States of the former Soviet Union to the NPT, much preparatory work has been undertaken for the introduction of comprehensive safeguards in those States. Individual States members of the IAEA and the IAEA secretariat have helped to provide information and equipment to facilitate the establishment of effective national systems of nuclear accountancy and control. Actual implementation of safeguards must, however, await the conclusion of formal safeguards agreements. To date, only one such agreement has come into force, namely, with Lithuania.

I should like to conclude with some brief comments relating to the Agency's finances, programme and personnel. The Agency's financial situation remains precarious. Crises have been avoided only because substantial shortfalls in budgetary contributions to our activities have been met by curtailing or deferring some activities. When resources are so scarce, it is particularly important that they be used in a way which reflects the Agency's dual functions in a balanced and equitable manner.

The community of States must not lose out by default on this era of opportunity and challenge. The IAEA stands ready to perform a verification role in a number of vital arms-control and disarmament measures which may now become possible. However, the Agency must be given adequate resources to perform new tasks. Without such resources, limits will inevitably be placed on its ability to match up to the high expectations that are placed upon it.

Austria is an excellent host to all the international organizations located in Vienna, and I should like to finish this statement by expressing before the Assembly the thanks of the IAEA to the Government of Austria.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Blix for his introduction to the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I congratulate him on his reappointment as Director General of the Agency.

I now call on the representative of Australia to introduce draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): I would like to introduce, on behalf of a wide and representative group of sponsors, draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, adopting the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The sponsors are Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, the Gambia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela. Australia, which has the honour of chairing the IAEA Board of Governors this year, is introducing the draft resolution in accordance with the tradition that a representative of the Board of Governors Bureau introduces the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA in the General Assembly.

I note that it is the understanding of the sponsors of the draft resolution, which is traditionally developed in Vienna before being forwarded to the General Assembly, that it is not the role of delegations in New York to amend what has been agreed in Vienna. In line with this role, in order not to compromise the negotiating efforts of our colleagues in Vienna and to avoid opening a Pandora's box of conflicting suggestions, the sponsors believe that amendments to the draft resolution should not be accepted, since none were agreed in Vienna. That is, the sponsors do not wish to assume a negotiating role independent of the Vienna structures. Were we to do so, we would make a complex and sensitive situation even more difficult.

Turning now to the report of the IAEA itself, I should like to express appreciation to the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, for his detailed and comprehensive statement

introducing the annual report on the operation of the Agency in 1992.

As one of the founding members, Australia has long been an active supporter of the Agency, which remains an organization of critical importance to the international community. In the new world situation, the IAEA continues to play a vital role in fostering global peace and security and in promoting cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Director General and his staff deserve to be commended for their tireless efforts and personal devotion to the tasks of adapting the Agency to the fundamental changes and of responding adequately to the new challenges of our time.

Australia considers the annual report of the IAEA as a successful attempt to present a comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of the Agency's activities in 1992. The report clearly demonstrates that the Agency has continued to fulfil its responsibilities, as provided for in its statute and in the resolutions of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

Australia participated in the process of detailed consideration and adoption of decisions related to IAEA activities during the period covered by its report. My delegation endorses this report, as it faithfully reflects the Agency's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, to improve the scope and the effectiveness of its nuclear-safety and nuclear-cooperation programmes, and to serve as a major source of technical assistance to Member States.

The past year has been an important one for the IAEA. New developments in disarmament and non-proliferation have had, and will continue to have, significant ramifications for the Agency: South Africa, in abandoning its nuclear-weapon status, has given a number of important verification tasks to the Agency; there are strong positive indications that Latin America and Africa may soon become nuclear-weapon-free continents; progress in the Middle East peace process may increase the prospects of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region; and the development of agreements on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could have implications for the IAEA in terms of possible international verification mechanisms.

We are pleased also that the General Assembly launched the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference on the Extension of the Treaty with the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in May this year.

While responding effectively to new and positive developments, it is clear from the report just introduced by the Director General that the Agency faces continuing challenges relating to the dismantling of Iraq's near-nuclear weapons capacity, the existence of nuclear weapons in some States of the former Soviet Union and North Korea's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations.

The Agency's safeguards system, together with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, constitute the principal international assurance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The safeguards system is not only fundamental to nuclear non-proliferation but it also underpins nuclear trade and cooperation. The efforts of the IAEA in the past few years to strengthen and improve the effectiveness and transparency of its safeguards system are commendable: action has been taken to reaffirm the Agency's right to undertake special inspections, to obtain earlier provision of design information on nuclear facilities and to establish a more comprehensive reporting system on nuclear imports and exports. New measures have also been proposed by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

Nuclear safety remains a key area of the IAEA's work. Nuclear-safety standards are constantly being developed and upgraded by the Agency, not least in response to public perceptions concerning the benefits and risks associated with nuclear energy. Considerable efforts have been devoted in the past year to this field, both in the domestic and international spheres. Work has been undertaken in particular in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central European countries to upgrade the safety of nuclear installations, with a specific initiative taken by the Agency, together with the United Nations Development Programme, to strengthen radiation protection in the States of the former Soviet Union. Also welcome is the development of a consensus on the structure of the main contents of a nuclear-safety convention.

The past year has also seen important developments in the Agency's technical assistance and cooperation activities, with new approaches being followed to increase the effective use of the resources available for the Agency's technical assistance programme.

Turning now to this year's draft resolution, we note that it is substantially the same as the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1992. Operative paragraph 4 would emphasize the centrality of strengthened safeguards to international security, regional security and technical cooperation; operative paragraph 6 would highlight the Agency's actions in strengthening technical assistance and

cooperation activities; operative paragraph 7 would draw attention to the impartial efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat in seeking to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the importance of full implementation of the safeguards agreement; and operative paragraph 8 would emphasize that the Agency is continuing to do very valuable and dangerous work in Iraq which, we believe, requires recognition by the General Assembly, and that effective fulfilment of Security Council resolutions is essential for the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and the assurances that the regime provides to all members of the international community.

We commend this draft resolution to delegations. It has attracted a broad sponsorship. It is a balanced text and seeks to be responsive to the needs and interests of all IAEA members. Importantly, the efforts of the negotiators in Vienna have been respected through the maintenance of language adopted by the Board of Governors and by the General Conference. Above all, we all have a common interest - to see the maintenance and strengthening of the Agency and the protection of its activities which promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To support this draft resolution is to support that objective.

Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria): As representative of the country that has hosted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its establishment over 36 years ago, I believe it is appropriate at the outset of my remarks to pay a tribute to the Agency for its continuing excellent record. I also wish to recognize the major contribution the Agency's competent and dedicated staff are making to the high profile of the IAEA.

Of course, I avail myself of this occasion also to congratulate the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, on his reappointment for a fourth term of office, approved by the recent session of the General Conference. We offer him our best wishes for further success in his work during the coming years. I should also like to express our appreciation to the Director General for his comprehensive and forward-looking statement this morning.

Sweeping winds of change are starting to penetrate the traditional patterns of our post-Second-World-War thinking. International organizations such as the United Nations, and also those of a more technical character like the IAEA, have entered a process of readapting their agendas to new realities. The margins for resorting to blueprint solutions have narrowed. This situation poses new problems and challenges; it also provides us with fresh opportunities, which we must seize.

With those preliminary remarks of a more general nature in mind, I shall now briefly address a number of issues relating to the work of the Agency from my Government's perspective.

Nuclear safety, including the safe disposal of nuclear waste, has been and will continue to be an issue of high priority for countries such as Austria, which, in the absence of any significant nuclear activities of their own, nevertheless see their populations threatened by the prospect of suffering unbearable damage originating from the operation of unsafe nuclear facilities in their immediate or wider neighbourhood. The bitter lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident have, however, taught countries operating nuclear-power plants that nuclear power is unlikely to survive a second event of a comparable scale. That accident appears to have sharpened safety consciousness worldwide.

At the same time, we note that political changes have prompted a new level of openness and of sensitivity to matters of nuclear safety in the Central and Eastern European countries, including Russia and the newly independent States. While we are fully aware of their present economic constraints and their pressing energy demands as they head towards market-oriented economies, we appeal to these Governments of those countries seriously to consider non-nuclear power options when making their intermediate- and long-term energy policy choices.

In the meantime, concern among our public remains high with regard to possible hazards, particularly from the continued operation of considerable numbers of reactors of older design that are still far from meeting acceptable modern safety standards.

In that context, we acknowledge the major efforts towards upgrading the safety of these installations exerted nationally by operator States. The services offered and the advice and assistance given by the IAEA in this context continue to be essential and indispensable. We also hope that the substantial coordinated technical and financial assistance provided by the Governments of leading safety technology holders, bilaterally and multilaterally, will further accelerate the process of redressing the situation.

We have also taken note with great interest of the various important tasks undertaken by the Agency in connection with the implementation of Agenda 21, as outlined this morning here by the Director General.

Progress recently achieved, after extensive preparatory expert work under the leadership of the Agency, towards a nuclear-safety convention gives rise to optimism that a

convention containing binding safety provisions, although limited in scope to civil nuclear-power reactors, could be agreed upon in 1994. Austria greets this development on the understanding that such a step would be followed without delay by negotiations for extending binding safety provisions to further sections of the nuclear fuel cycle.

To our regret, the status of ongoing negotiations for an improved liability regime for nuclear damage is far less promising, owing to still widely differing views among the interested parties.

Austria strongly supports the IAEA's efforts further to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Results attained so far, such as the reassertion of the Agency's authority to conduct special inspections and the acceptance of broadened access to safeguards-relevant information to give greater assurance against the existence of undeclared nuclear activities are encouraging steps in the right direction. Further measures for reinforcing the system will have to be studied. None of them, however, can be a substitute for truly universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the *bona fide* execution of its full-scope safeguards provisions by all States.

The Agency's safeguards system has proved to be an important verification tool contributing to international arms control efforts. In this regard an expanded role for the Agency's verification functions, extending to areas which only recently have come under substantive discussion, might, as indicated by the Director General in his statement, soon become reality - as for example in the context of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty - in the safeguarding of fissionable material recovered from warheads in the course of the implementation of the START I and START II agreements and in eventual arrangements for a verified end to production of fissionable material for weapons purposes to complement nuclear-arms-reduction agreements.

As we approach the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, I am gratified to note that, apart from the fact that all nuclear-weapon States are now parties, a substantial number of additional non-nuclear-weapon States have in the more recent past acceded to the Treaty, bringing it a step closer to universality.

We have noted the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to put into effect its earlier intention to withdraw from the Treaty. With others, we strongly appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to maintain that position and urgently to resume full cooperation with the Agency in the execution of the safeguards agreement and in resolving outstanding

safeguards issues, for its own benefit as well as in the interest of security and stability in the region and in the world. In that context we want to assure the Agency of our full confidence in its impartiality and integrity in the performance of its safeguards obligations under the statute.

Technical assistance and cooperation constitute one of the key elements of the Agency's activities. From the standpoint of my Government's support for that part of the programme, it is reassuring to note that the predominant portion of requests from Member States relate to non-power applications of nuclear technologies, notably in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, industry, physical and chemical sciences, and radiation protection. We also appreciate that particular emphasis is now being placed on the actual requirements as seen by the recipient countries and on infrastructural improvements, taking into account policies of sustainable development.

Let me conclude by reaffirming my Government's commitment to its role as the host country of the Agency, and Austria's continued high regard for the efficiency of this important member of the United Nations family. I also thank the Director General most warmly for his very kind remarks in that respect.

Mr. LAMAMRA (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Allow me first of all to thank Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his very cogent presentation to the General Assembly of the thorough and many-faceted IAEA report. Mr. Blix has skilfully directed the Agency activities referred to in the report and has also contributed greatly, over the past 12 years, to the consolidation of the IAEA's authority and efficacy, thus renewing the confidence Member States have in him and leading to his reappointment. It is therefore a special pleasure for me to express to him, once again, warm congratulations from the Algerian delegation and from me personally.

In the sphere of IAEA activities, the period covered in the report before us has been a vigorous one internationally, even though in this particular domain, as in so many others, efforts to strengthen multilateral action for development seem doomed to advance only imperfectly and incompletely. As in the case of many other intergovernmental organizations, the adverse effect of shrinking financial resources is slowing down the Agency's impetus and unfortunately narrowing its field of activities, while at the same time mankind's ingenious breakthroughs in mastering the forces of nature seem to be constantly expanding the range of practical applications of nuclear technology in the service of the human race and its well-being. At a time when there are both promises and hazards inherent in the awakened interest of a number of

nations that are giving nuclear energy a greater role, the IAEA, whose management and secretariat have fully grasped the meaning and importance of this major trend, must now, more than ever, be the crucible of strengthened international cooperation that embodies a fair balance between the Agency's *raison d'être*, which is the promotion of scientific, economic and social progress to respond to the growing needs of the entire international community, and its statutory obligation to monitor the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through its safeguards system.

The annual report of the IAEA gives us a very accurate account of the Agency's multifaceted efforts over the past year. This far-reaching undertaking has a number of positive impacts on the economies and the daily lives of certain developing countries that receive technical assistance from the Agency. These positive impacts, modest but none the less appreciable, can be seen in the valuable support of nuclear technology for such projects as the irradiation of foodstuffs in countries struggling either against famine or for nutritional self-sufficiency. There is also potential for considerable positive impact, through increased output and improved cost-effectiveness, in a number of fields of activity, such as agriculture, public health, industry or the use of locally produced radio-isotopes.

In addition to all that the IAEA, if given the proper resources, could do in contributing to sustainable economic and ecological development, it also has an important role to play in the vast area of human security, whose interrelated dimensions include the legitimate and widespread public apprehension regarding the devastating effects of nuclear disasters. This role is inherent in the Agency's fundamental responsibility for the safety of nuclear facilities in that it requires measures for practical cooperation and regulated output.

It is fitting here to underline the importance that is so naturally attached to the efforts that the Agency's directors should continue to make in order to achieve a dynamic balance between monitoring activities and promotional activities. In this regard, providing adequate, reliable and predictable financial resources for the Agency's technical assistance and technical cooperation activities should become an essential obligation for all States that desire to make it possible for the IAEA to carry out its mission to the fullest.

In this light, the universal influence of the IAEA and its prestige in the developing countries and in public opinion would be better and more lastingly served by concrete and significant achievements in the areas of technical assistance and nuclear safety. At the same time,

the very limited number of instances of safeguards-related problems that the Agency has dealt with, calmly and in the spirit of finding appropriate solutions, should result not in hampering the transfer of nuclear technology for the benefit of the developing countries but, rather, in providing reassurance regarding the IAEA's ability to assume its full role *vis-à-vis* the rights and obligations of parties to the safeguards agreements.

Against the dual backdrop of the IAEA's influence and the consensual nature that prevails in its relations with States, one of the aspects of the General Assembly's consideration of the Agency's annual report should be, we believe, to promote the widest possible interest in the Agency on the part of the international community and to contribute to encouraging all States to join it so that its membership can keep pace with the progress of the United Nations towards universality. Furthermore, the changes under way regarding the composition of the United Nations bodies having restricted membership should be quickly taken up by the IAEA so that it can enhance the representativeness of its Board of Governors by means of an expansion that would do justice to the desire for participation and would reward the deserving progress of certain developing countries in the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Algeria has every reason to be pleased about the relations it has developed with the IAEA. These flourishing relations go back many years, and through the years they have involved a great range of projects for technical cooperation, which have benefited from IAEA expertise and financing. These relations have also involved Algeria's voluntary submission of its two research and radio-isotope-production reactors to the Agency's safeguards system.

From a more general standpoint, Algeria has spared no effort to make its contribution to the proper functioning of the Agency and its main organs. We welcome the fact that, in return, the member States of the Agency conferred upon me, and, thus, on Algeria, the presidency of the Board of Governors for the period covered by the report the General Assembly now has before it.

Mr. UNNIKRISHNAN (India): At the very outset, I congratulate Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on his reappointment for a fourth term, with the unanimous approval of the recent General Conference of the Agency. During the last 12 years Mr. Blix has served the Agency with distinction and wisdom, and we have every confidence that he will continue to provide effective leadership to the IAEA in the new and varied tasks before it.

We have carefully perused the IAEA report and have also listened to the statement of its Director General with great interest. India has been a member of the IAEA since its inception in 1956. We have attached great importance to the objectives and activities of the Agency, as outlined in its Statute, and have been active participants in the IAEA from the beginning. The Agency's primary objective, as clearly spelt out in its Statute, is to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and development throughout the world.

We must also remind ourselves, when it becomes necessary, that its primary objective remains the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In recent years, for a number of political reasons, the Agency's "safeguards" role has come to acquire public prominence. We in India have always reaffirmed the importance of safeguards and have supported the Agency's activities in this area. At the same time, we attach importance to the Agency's promotional role in the fields of power, agriculture, medicine and other areas. The vast majority of the Agency's members, particularly the developing countries, have expectations of the IAEA and its role in the transfer of technology and in scientific and technical cooperation.

We note that these issues came up for discussion during the recent General Conference. The resolution adopted on the strengthening of the main activities (GC(XXXVII)/RES/618) asks the Agency to present new initiatives, particularly with regard to technical cooperation activities aimed at enhancing the scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. We look forward to the Agency's initiatives in response to this resolution. A specific initiative in this regard over the last year is the proposal on practical utilization of food irradiation in developing countries. We welcome the General Conference resolution (GC(XXXVII)/RES/616) on this subject, and hope that further work will be done in this area, as a concrete and visible example of how the IAEA can assist developing countries.

The Agency's so-called failure to detect weaponization programmes in some countries has been referred to. In recent years the Agency has been criticized by some sections of the media on this score. In our view, such criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the Agency's proper role and functioning. The Agency cannot be a policeman on the prowl. It cannot be expected to go looking for bombs in every basement. Its role is to apply safeguards, essentially as a confidence-building measure in terms of the safeguards agreements that Member States voluntarily enter into with it. We believe that it will be useful for the Agency to explain the nature of its activities

to the public and the media so that such misconceptions can be removed.

References have been made to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India has always unequivocally supported all efforts at non-proliferation which are universal and non-discriminatory. However, I would like to repeat that we cannot subscribe to a Treaty or an attitude that divides the world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots", with an inherently inequitable set of responsibilities and obligations for the two. I hope the NPT Review and extension conference in 1995 will be an opportunity for States Parties to ponder over how it can be made into an instrument leading to genuine non-proliferation. In this context, I would also reiterate our commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament. The safeguards the IAEA implements flow from the agreements that Member States voluntarily enter into with it. This does not make the IAEA the secretariat of the NPT. The safeguards can also flow from other bilateral or multilateral arrangements, voluntarily entered into by sovereign States.

India is one of the founder signatories of the chemical weapons Convention. It has been suggested that the IAEA draw upon the provisions of the verification mechanism under this Convention to bring about modifications in the Agency's safeguards system. In this context, it should be recognized that the chemical weapons Convention is universal and non-discriminatory. Moreover, it is still at a nascent stage, and therefore rushing to copy its provisions before it has even come into effect would not be prudent.

References have been made to the implementation of the safeguards agreements between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is a substantive and complex issue that has been under discussion at the IAEA and elsewhere for months. Our position has been that a solution to the issue should be found through patient negotiations and discussions. Any other avenue will not achieve the desired results. It is for this reason that we have in the past urged patience and perseverance. It is also for this reason that we have had to abstain on some of the resolutions on this subject at the IAEA. Despite reservations on some wording in the present draft resolution, we would go along with it in the interest of consensus, while urging both the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to persevere in their efforts to cooperate and fully implement the safeguards agreement. We also urge others concerned to continue to support such efforts.

Before I conclude, allow me to reiterate the need for the Agency to redouble its efforts in the promotion of the peaceful application of nuclear energy and to initiate

large-scale public awareness programmes. The safeguards system should be streamlined to be both productive and cost-effective. For our part, we will render our full and active support and cooperation to the Agency in successfully achieving these aims.

Mr. WLOSOWICZ (Poland): At the outset I should like to express Poland's deep appreciation of the work of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its highly competent staff. This has been a particularly challenging year, in which the IAEA has performed very well. The exemplary manner in which the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, has been conducting the work of his Agency merits our gratitude and respect. It therefore gives me great satisfaction to convey to the Director General my delegation's heartfelt congratulations on his reappointment to another term of office.

The delegation of Poland considers the annual report of the IAEA and the introductory statement by the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, to be a successful attempt to present a comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of the Agency's activities in 1992. The overall activity of the Agency has remained faithful to the objectives enshrined in its statute: to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, through its safeguards activity, to serve the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The latest developments in international relations have once again demonstrated the important role the Agency plays in the sphere of international security, economic development, nuclear safety and the human environment. These developments open new prospects for the Agency and, at the same time, pose new challenges to it.

Some events seem to indicate that the role of the Agency may be further expanded in the future to cover new verification tasks both in nuclear non-proliferation and in the process of nuclear disarmament. As we see it, an expanded verification function for the IAEA in respect of nuclear material released from a reduction in nuclear weapons would no doubt help the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and world-wide public acceptance of nuclear-power plants.

The Agency should be praised for its continued efforts in Iraq in fulfilment of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's non-compliance with its non-proliferation Treaty obligations exposed an urgent need for IAEA safeguards to be strengthened.

The Agency's intensive safeguards activities in South Africa as well as in verifying the termination of its past nuclear-weapons programme, has made credible that country's integration into the international nuclear

non-proliferation regime and is contributing to the process of the denuclearization of Africa.

We also welcome the news from Latin America, where the quadripartite agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA is close to implementation, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco will, it is hoped, soon come into force and cover all countries of the continent.

Recent progress in the peace process in the Middle East opens up brighter prospects for a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in that area with corresponding IAEA safeguards as part of the agreement.

We view all these positive developments in the context of the preparations for the 1995 review and extension Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. We support the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which we believe remains indispensable for the security of its States parties and the world at large. We also see the need for a thorough and meaningful discussion of the Treaty's implementation, including the articles on nuclear disarmament and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Expected progress in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and in the provision by all nuclear Powers of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should help to ensure the success of the Conference.

In the context of extending and strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty, we remain concerned about the question of the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the recent IAEA General Conference we joined others in urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its non-proliferation Treaty commitments and safeguards obligations.

The IAEA activities aiming at the application of safeguards in the newly independent States with substantial nuclear programmes which emerged from the former Soviet Union are closely followed by and have the firm support of Poland. We urge all States which still remain outside the non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system to accede to them at an early date.

Nuclear-power plants operated or constructed in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of them neighbours of Poland, have during 1992 and 1993 been subject to review and an assessment of their safety features. Improvements have been and still are being introduced in order to remedy the shortcomings identified in nuclear-power plants and in national nuclear regulatory

systems. We are grateful to donor countries, to international organizations and, above all, to the IAEA for the assistance that has already been provided under this programme, in which Polish experts also participate.

Poland supports the Agency's work on preparing a nuclear safety convention. As regards the issue of liability for nuclear damage, we commend the substantial progress made by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage in preparing a revision of the Vienna Convention.

Poland traditionally supports the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, being both a beneficiary of and a contributor to it. International cooperation has been vital for the development of our nuclear industry, research and education.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate our appreciation to the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, and our support for the Agency's goals. That support finds its reflection in our co-sponsoring of the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA.

Mr. MALIK (Iraq) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Iraq participates once again in the discussion on the agenda item on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which appears on the agenda on an annual basis. Every time the delegation of Iraq emphasizes that it is necessary not to politicize the work of the IAEA and to protect the technical nature of its work.

The politicization of the work of the Agency is very dangerous in both the short term and the long term. Hence we must all be objective, clear and take into consideration the real interests of member States. In this way we could avoid the narrow interests which push some countries into the dangerous path of politicization.

I have brought to this meeting copies of two documents. The first of these is the report submitted by Mr. Rolf Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, to the President of the Security Council. This report, which is contained in document S/26571, dated 12 October 1993, includes the minutes of the discussions that took place in Baghdad in October 1993. Paragraph 14, which is in the section of the report dealing with Iraq's nuclear programme, reads as follows:

"IAEA is confident that the essential elements of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme are understood and have been dismantled. The remaining outstanding issues for compliance with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13

of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) relate to procurement and official acceptance of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991)." (*S/26571, Appendix, para. 14*)

Paragraph 15 reads as follows:

"Iraq has now provided IAEA with critical information regarding suppliers of prohibited and other materials and sources of technical advice. The information appears to be complete and verifiable. This information will be verified in the course of the next few weeks. With the provision of this information, Iraq has now complied with all disclosure requirements concerning its previous nuclear weapons programme as contained in resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991)." (*ibid., para. 15*)

Paragraph 16, which relates to implementation of the monitoring and verification plan, reads as follows:

"IAEA has phased in elements of its plan over the last 15 months. Iraq is aware of all the elements of this plan." (*ibid., para. 16*)

Paragraph 18 reads as follows:

"IAEA is satisfied that the plan has so far been implemented properly and will add or subtract elements as conditions require." (*ibid., para. 18*)

The second document of which I have brought a copy is a Security Council report - document S/26584, dated 14 October 1993 - containing the text of a letter from the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, to the United Nations Secretary-General. This letter says:

"As you can see from the Joint Report, the IAEA has received the long requested critical information regarding suppliers of prohibited and other material and sources of technical advice. Subject to the verification of this information for accuracy and completeness, Iraq would be regarded to have complied with all disclosure requirements concerning its nuclear activities as provided for in resolutions 687 and 707 (1991). This is similar to the conclusions of the Special Commission with regard to the disclosure by Iraq of the information relevant to its proscribed programmes in the ballistic and biological areas." (*S/26584, p. 2*)

Mr. Blix has confirmed that fact this morning.

These testimonies of the two officials directly responsible for the implementation of Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) constitute crystal-clear evidence of the positive progress achieved recently, of the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities at the highest level with the various inspection teams, and of Iraq's full compliance with the said resolution.

Any objective reader of the two Security Council documents from which I have just quoted - the one containing the Special Commission's report, and the other containing the letter from the Director General of the IAEA - would not fail to recognize the positive atmosphere of and the great progress that has been made in the relations between Iraq and those bodies.

The General Assembly should encourage this approach, rather than put obstacles in the way of the positive and constructive actions that Iraq has taken so far. There are those who insist on attacking Iraq, on manipulating the facts for political ends and on fabricating justifications for continuing the inhuman economic blockade against the people of Iraq, which has led to the death of hundreds of thousands of men and women - including old people - and children.

Iraq has discharged all its obligations under Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and it expects the Security Council to end the economic embargo on its exports, in accordance with paragraph 22 of the same resolution. The Council's resolution which has been described as binding, must be binding to all parties, including the Security Council members.

Having said this concerning the binding nature of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), I should like to refer to paragraph 14 thereof, in which the Council:

"Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction". (*Security Council resolution 687 (1991), para. 14*)

It is worth observing that none of the representatives who have spoken so far has mentioned this paragraph or saw fit to call upon all the States of the region to work seriously towards its implementation, by adhering to the non-proliferation Treaty and accepting an effective safeguards system.

I should like, in conclusion, to comment on draft resolution A/48/L.13. The eighth preambular paragraph has become anachronistic indeed as it does not reflect the

present realities, to which the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Director General of IAEA have attested. According to the testimonies of those two gentlemen, Iraq has been cooperating and has abided by the provisions of Security Council 687 (1991). Consequently, the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution should read as follows:

"Noting the statements and actions of the Agency concerning Iraq's compliance with its non-proliferation obligations."

Consequently, this preambular paragraph in A/48/L.13 as it stands now contradicts the reports of the president of the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA, and cannot be considered as it is correct. We cannot agree to it.

As for operative paragraph 8, it fails to mention the discussions that took place in Baghdad in July, in New York in September and again in Baghdad in October of this year. These important and constructive talks took place between Iraq and the Special Commission and an IAEA team. Consequently, this paragraph does not reflect the real facts, which have become known to everybody here.

For all these reasons, the delegation of Iraq would request separate voting on the aforementioned paragraphs and on the resolution as a whole.

Before I conclude my statement, I cannot but say that it is really ironic and paradoxical that Israel is one of the sponsors of this draft resolution.

Ms. MASON (Canada): At the outset, let me echo the satisfaction which others before me have expressed to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his detailed and comprehensive statement.

Canada is very pleased to sponsor draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1 on the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is most appropriate at this time to acknowledge the range of work of this important United Nations agency.

Now more than ever, we are aware of the vital role that the IAEA plays in supporting the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole, given the Agency's paramount role as the custodian of international safeguards arrangements. The IAEA is also key in ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy and in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

In the past year, the Agency has faced some new - and, unfortunately, disquieting - challenges to the integrity of the international system it supports, challenges posed especially by developments in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, both of which are referred to in the draft resolution. However, these developments have also proved that the Agency is the best forum to deal with such problems. The Government of Canada remains concerned about non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement and continues to urge that country to meet its obligations. We also want to take this opportunity to reiterate that the Agency functions to advance the interests of all Member States and thus acts on behalf of the international community as a whole.

I want to use this opportunity to share briefly some Canadian thinking about the orientation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In our statement to the recent General Conference, we proposed that the basic mission of the Agency be refocused to consist of three pillars: safeguards, safety, and technology transfer.

The purpose of safeguards is to ensure that an effective and efficient system is implemented and maintained. Study is now being given to how to strengthen and streamline safeguards. Canada believes that Agency safeguards should evolve from a purely quantitative system, based on material balance accounting, to one which includes the detection of undeclared activities and facilities. There are several alternative safeguards models which are capable of doing this. The reform of safeguards will require the marshalling of our collective political will, to ensure that our joint efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation are as effective and efficient as possible.

Safety is another key function of the Agency, since being able to demonstrate the safety of all nuclear activities is one of the keys to furthering public acceptance of nuclear energy. For many countries, nuclear power will become an increasingly important source for meeting growing energy demands. It also offers some environmental benefits. We therefore look forward to the early conclusion of the negotiation on the nuclear safety convention, which will be an important international instrument in this field.

Technology transfer is another key activity of the Agency. It permits the appropriate applications of nuclear technology in meeting the needs of Member States in the fields of food and agriculture, human health, water resources, environmental studies, industrial applications and, of course, energy.

In Canada's view, each of these three pillars is interrelated with and interdependent on the other. Taken together, we believe that this three-pronged approach can lead to a good balance - and, I might say, a mutually reinforcing balance - among the Agency's activities.

In conclusion, the Canadian delegation is pleased to co-sponsor this draft resolution, and, along with the Australian delegation, which introduced it, Canada commends it to all delegations as an expression of the commitment we have all made to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to nuclear non-proliferation.

Mr. HOU Zhitong (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation listened carefully to the statement of Mr. Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has taken note of its annual report. Over the past year, the Agency has done a great deal of work and exerted active efforts in such major fields as safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear safety. For this, we wish to express our satisfaction.

Mr. Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The Chinese delegation warmly congratulates Mr. Blix on his reappointment as Director General of the Agency.

International cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an important task confronting the Agency. Nuclear energy, as a clean and reliable alternative energy source, has brought prospects for development. Many countries, especially the developing countries, urgently need nuclear energy for their economic development and environmental protection. The international community expects the IAEA to make further efforts and contributions in this regard.

Another important task facing the IAEA is to implement safeguards that will prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including nuclear explosive devices. Over the years, the Agency has accomplished a lot and accumulated wide experience in this regard. The safeguards regime is a universally accepted measure for the prevention of nuclear proliferation. In order to ensure that international cooperation on nuclear energy will serve peaceful purposes, the acceptance of IAEA safeguards should be the prerequisite for such cooperation.

In the past year, the IAEA, as an intergovernmental organization, has played a unique role in international cooperation for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But, it should be noted that current international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy is far from satisfactory, and is faced with numerous difficulties and problems. The attempt to monopolize nuclear science and technology and, under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to restrict and undermine the legitimate rights and interests of the developing countries in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will facilitate neither international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy nor the international endeavour to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Agency is faced with the challenge of how to strike an equitable balance between efforts to promote international cooperation in nuclear energy and those being made to strengthen the safeguards regime. The Chinese delegation is of the view that equal importance should be attached to both of those IAEA functions without prejudice to either. China supports the Agency's efforts in its safeguards activities and believes that they should be aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation rather than at impeding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by developing countries. Should disputes arise in this connection, they should be solved by the parties directly involved through constructive consultations and negotiations and not by the imposition of pressure or even sanctions. Practice has shown that neither pressure nor sanctions will help to solve the problem.

I should like to reiterate that the Chinese Government's policy has always been against advocating, encouraging or engaging in nuclear proliferation and against assisting other countries to develop nuclear weapons. China's nuclear-export policy has always been based strictly on three principles, namely, that such exports are intended for peaceful purposes, that IAEA safeguards have been accepted and adhered to and that there will be no transfer of material to any third country without China's prior consent. China will, as always, continue to contribute to and make efforts towards achieving international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to realize greater benefits for mankind derived from nuclear energy.

Mr. GUILLAUME (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): It is my honour to speak today on behalf of the European Community and its member States.

The Assembly has before it today the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) drafted by its Director General, Mr. Blix, whose mandate has just been renewed for four more years. Before beginning consideration of the report, I should like, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, to take this opportunity to congratulate the Director General for his work, to thank him for the able manner in which he has conducted the work of the Agency for the past 12 years

and to convey to him our warmest wishes for the years ahead, years that will be decisive for the policy of non-proliferation, in particular, in which his is a crucial role.

At the outset, I should like to speak about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an area in which the international community and the Agency have had to deal with major developments during the past year.

The most serious problem was the non-implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The European Community and its member States remain deeply concerned at the fact that, notwithstanding the international community's forbearance, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not yet fulfilled the commitments into which it has entered; they solemnly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reaffirm its unconditional adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to implement in good faith the full-scope safeguards agreement entered into with the IAEA on 30 January 1992 and to agree to inspection of the two sites designated by the Agency. Furthermore, the European Community and its member States keenly regret that in the course of recent consultations with an IAEA delegation at Pyongyang the Democratic Republic of Korea expressed no readiness to honour its commitments but, on the contrary, sought to limit the scope of the consultations and even to set conditions for their continuation, which is unacceptable. However, we hope that the consultations can resume without preconditions and in a constructive spirit.

The European Community and its member States thank the Director General and his secretariat for the diligence, professional skill and impartiality they have demonstrated throughout this delicate period, and we would ask them to continue their activities with vigour. In addition, we would request the Agency's Director General to keep the Security Council and States members of the Agency informed of any major development in this connection.

In addition, the European Community and its member States hope for resumption of the dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea that will in the near future, in keeping with the Joint Declaration signed on 31 December 1991, lead to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

The European Community and its member States wish also to express their concern at the situation in the former Soviet Union. We welcome, of course, the accession of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

and Uzbekistan to the NPT. They also appreciate the secretariat's efforts to prepare for the implementation of safeguards in other States of the former USSR. We urge those countries, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. More generally, we urge those two States to apply, without delay, the commitments contained in the Lisbon Protocol. The European Community and its member States hope that the agreement reached between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 3 September 1993 concerning the return to Russia of those nuclear warheads located in Ukraine will be implemented without delay.

Another source of major concern is the situation in Iraq. The European Community and its member States regret that that country has not yet implemented the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). They urge Iraq to provide the IAEA with all the necessary data on its nuclear programme that is not yet available.

The European Community and its member States request the Director General to implement without delay the provisions of the plans for future ongoing monitoring called for in Security Council resolution 715 (1991) while continuing, as provided in resolution 687 (1991), to seek out the constituent elements of Iraq's clandestine programme that have not yet been disclosed.

Another major development concerning non-proliferation was, of course, the South African Government's acknowledgement of the fact that nuclear explosive devices had been developed in South Africa during the 1980s and that they had been dismantled prior to South Africa's accession to the NPT. The European Community and its member States welcome that transparency, which demonstrates that the renunciation of a clandestine nuclear programme is possible and that it can be done at the will of the country in question. We also take note of the Director General's report on the Agency's verification activities in South Africa.

In that connection, the European Community and its member States welcome the substantial progress made over the past year in the negotiations on the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa.

The European Community and its member States welcome the progress towards peace in the Middle East. Recent developments justify the hope that conditions for the creation of a denuclearized zone in that region and implementation of the full-scope safeguards system in the Middle East can soon be realized.

The European Community and its member States hope that the process of ratification of the quadripartite agreement signed by Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material and the IAEA will soon be completed.

To conclude with the subject of non-proliferation, the European Community and its member States welcome with satisfaction the recent accessions of countries to the NPT, which constitute important steps towards the universality of the non-proliferation regime, and we strongly urge all countries that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty for an indefinite period. This was reaffirmed at the first session of the Preparatory Committee held at New York last May. We would recall that the NPT is the only comprehensive framework for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, the European Community and its member States are prepared to assume their full responsibilities and to spare no effort that can contribute to the success of the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference.

On 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva adopted by consensus a decision giving the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. A multilateral negotiation will soon begin, with a view to achieving a universally applicable treaty providing for an effective verification regime. The European Community and its member States welcome this decisive step, which will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We have noted in recent months some encouraging developments which will certainly have a positive effect on the question of a nuclear-test moratorium. Even if the Twelve cannot be indifferent to the recent test in China, the first in a year, the recent decisions of some nuclear-weapon States to suspend their nuclear tests are an important development. We must welcome this further progress in the struggle against nuclear-weapons proliferation. Moreover, we should recall the commitment undertaken by the United States and the four members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that signed the Lisbon Protocol to reduce significantly their nuclear arsenals; this constitutes another step in the same direction. The Twelve hope that the parties concerned will soon be able to overcome any obstacle in the way of implementation of the Protocol.

The European Community and its member States are pleased that the proposals they made two years ago to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system were adopted by the Board of Governors and that the measures necessary for their application are being gradually implemented. For instance, machinery has been set in motion for notification

of exports and imports of nuclear material and exports of some non-nuclear equipment and material. It should be recalled that the purpose of this machinery is to give the secretariat an overview of nuclear transfers and production throughout the world. If we wish to achieve that aim, all countries must participate in this machinery and communicate the relevant information. With respect to the European Community and its member States, such information is now being regularly communicated to the Director General.

The strengthening of the Agency's safeguards is not yet complete. Substantial efforts remain to be made to deal with the real dangers of proliferation. In this respect, the European Community and its member States are pleased that the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted at the Twelve's initiative.

The study conducted by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system provided a useful working basis for the secretariat to review the safeguards system more thoroughly. The purpose of this exercise is to make possible better detection of anomalies indicative of clandestine activity, even though it is difficult to see how the Agency will ever be able to guarantee with any certainty the absence of clandestine activities world wide.

Furthermore, while we cannot ignore the need to reduce the cost of inspection missions, we must ensure that this requirement does not hinder the development of a consistent plan that can ensure the overall efficiency of the Agency's safeguards, taking into account in a balanced way the actual risks of proliferation. The European Community and its member States listened with great interest to the Director General's report on the measures taken to strengthen and improve the Agency's safeguards system and look forward to the concrete proposals he will make on this subject to the Board of Governors in December on the basis of the findings of the Standing Advisory Group and the deliberations of the Board of Governors in June.

The ongoing negotiations to achieve a partnership between the Agency's inspection teams and EURATOM have made substantial progress over the past year. Enhanced cooperation has already had beneficial effects on the Agency's budget. The European Community and its member States welcome this. However, the full benefit anticipated from this agreement remains subject to many contingencies.

The commitment of the two teams of inspectors to apply the partnership principles is indispensable. The

European Community and its member States request the Director General to pursue discussions with a view to putting this partnership fully into effect as soon as possible. In the discussions on the partnership, one of the most important elements of the progress achieved in recent months has been the confirmation of EURATOM as a regional safeguards system for ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted to uses other than those declared by the States members of the European Community. EURATOM thus exercises functions that cannot in any way be exercised by a national monitoring system.

Today, EURATOM is the sole example of an organization that makes possible the full implementation of safeguards while adhering to five essential elements: a constitutional framework for political cooperation; a well-defined legal and regulatory framework; a transparent budgetary and financial framework; an operational framework providing for the possibility of imposing sanctions; and, lastly, several decades of experience in the effective implementation of safeguards.

The status of regional safeguards system could be conferred on other regional institutions, provided that certain clearly defined conditions were met. That is why the European Community and its member States urge the Director General to consider and submit to the Board of Governors a document on the conditions that must be met by a regional organization if it is to negotiate a partnership agreement with the Agency. This document should precisely stipulate the conditions for cooperation with respect to safeguards.

The European Community and its member States are deeply committed to the nuclear-export-control systems and, more specifically, to the guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The European Community and its member States appeal to the supplier countries that have not yet acceded to the export-control guidelines to do so as soon as possible. We wish to contribute to the success of the regime for controlling the export of nuclear material and technology of dual use which entered into force in January 1993. All the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have decided to require the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities, present and future, as a condition for new significant commitments to supply non-nuclear-weapons States.

Having spoken of non-proliferation and the safeguards system, I should now like to touch on the activities of the Agency in the sphere of nuclear safety, protection against radiation and technical cooperation.

The benefits of the Agency's activities in areas where nuclear technology is not being used for energy purposes

are often underestimated and poorly understood. I should like to speak first of nuclear safety, a sector in which the Agency plays a primary role.

The European Community and its member States welcome the substantial progress made by the group of experts that is to prepare a convention on nuclear safety. In fact, we were the promoters of the convening of the Conference on nuclear safety which decided to initiate the process of negotiating that international convention. We believe that the convention is a necessary instrument to improve world wide, the safety system on the one hand and the cohesion of the basic safety principles on the other. That is why the European Community and its member States invite all States - particularly those with nuclear reactors on their territory - to participate actively in the preparatory work for the convention.

We can say that a clear consensus is emerging on limiting the scope of the convention, for now, to power reactors. A diplomatic conference should be able to finalize the text of the convention as early as possible in 1994.

As regards a progressive approach to establishing an international nuclear safety regime, we welcome the fact that the last General Conference provided an opportunity for the international community to express its desire to start work as soon as possible on preparing a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, once the work now under way of developing basic principles for managing these wastes has achieved a broad international consensus.

The Twelve recognize the usefulness of more advanced technical research into the safety of other parts of the nuclear cycle, and also recognize that this work may in due course facilitate the future development of existing international instruments and of those to come. The European Community and its member States introduced a draft resolution on the subject at the IAEA General Conference.

The European Community and its member States attach particular importance to nuclear safety in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former USSR, and recall the Community countries' substantial contributions both in a strictly Community context - PHARE and TACIS - and in the Group of 24 and the multilateral nuclear safety funds. We commend the Agency on its important role in this regard.

The Operational Safety Review Teams and Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams missions, as well as the programmes for problem reactors, have

continued to provide useful reference information for the activities of the Group of 24. New initiatives, such as the joint activities of the IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme to strengthen radiation protection infrastructures and nuclear safety infrastructures in the countries of the former USSR, and the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project, are adding to the Agency's involvement in improving nuclear safety.

For some time, the IAEA Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage has been reviewing the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and preparing a new convention on supplementary financing. Substantial results have been achieved. The Community and its member States attach great importance to the new drafts; we sincerely hope that the ongoing discussions will make it possible to arrive quickly at solutions satisfactory to all concerned and that a diplomatic conference will be able to meet as soon as possible to finalize the draft conventions.

The European Community and its member States view providing technical assistance as one of the Agency's essential tasks. We support the efforts along these lines made by the IAEA secretariat. We feel that the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, whether medical, agricultural, industrial or for power production, should be accessible to all States. The Agency has a central role to play in accelerating and facilitating this trend, while ensuring that the development of nuclear activities goes hand in hand with observance of the highest levels of safety and radiation protection. The Twelve States members of the European Community are ready to lend the Agency their support in this area, to the extent that budgetary considerations permit.

The European Community and its member States regret having to express their concern, as they did last year, about the Agency's financial situation. In the interests of the Agency's proper functioning, we appeal to all member States to pay their contributions to the Agency's budget on time.

We appreciate the efforts of the Director General and his colleagues to ensure that the Agency can function in these difficult conditions. In this context, the Twelve are the more appreciative of the exercise recently begun by the secretariat to study the efficiency of the Agency's programmes in greater depth. The Agency must more than ever be able to concentrate on its essential tasks and terminate activities of secondary importance.

Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary): The annual report for 1992 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has submitted to the General Assembly, together with the

supplementary oral report and the introductory statement by the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, reflect very well the multifaceted activity of the Agency and the results achieved. The Agency's work, carefully balanced between the main fields of its activity, deserves the recognition of the Member States, as expressed at the thirty-seventh session of the Agency's General Conference, held only a short time ago.

Reiterating that evaluation, I wish to express the Hungarian Government's appreciation of the skilful and fully committed work carried out by the Agency's staff in order to promote the peaceful application of nuclear energy worldwide, enhance the safety of the nuclear facilities in operation, and provide verifiable assurances for the community of nations about the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes.

On behalf of the Hungarian delegation, and also on my own behalf, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Blix on his recent reappointment for another term of office, and assure him of our continued support and cooperation in discharging his important and responsible duties.

Despite some discouraging signs, the positive trend towards attaining our common goal, the establishment of a genuinely universal nuclear non-proliferation regime, has continued during the period under review. We are pleased to note that all nuclear-weapon States are now Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); South Africa has abandoned its nuclear weapons programme; and Latin America as well as Africa may soon emerge as nuclear-weapon-free continents. In view of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, these facts should be considered very promising.

However, international efforts should be redoubled to prevent and finally eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation, and also to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects. Pursuing its fully committed non-proliferation policy, the Hungarian Government continues to take an active part in this endeavour and once again urges all those States that have not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and also to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

The IAEA safeguards system, a key element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has always played a crucial role in preventing the use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes. We are appreciative of the work done so far by the Agency to improve the efficacy of the existing safeguards system. The purpose is clear: to make the safeguards system more capable of covering both

declared and undeclared activities, thus providing sufficiently convincing assurances for all States about the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programmes of other States. The Hungarian Government supports the ongoing work in that field, and once again reiterates its readiness to make all its facilities available to the IAEA to carry out the related tests and trials.

It is regrettable that the international community has again been compelled, in the period under review, to deal with problems endangering the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In addition to the case of Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, attention has had to be paid to the ambiguous attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement it concluded with the IAEA.

I should like to express our appreciation to the Agency for all its work and efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq. We are convinced that the IAEA will soon be able to fulfil its remaining tasks, including ongoing long-term monitoring and verification.

The Hungarian Government is gravely concerned at the lack of progress in the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency. We deeply regret that the IAEA has not yet been able to clarify the discrepancies discovered in the initial inventory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. All the efforts made by the Director General on the basis of the respective resolutions of the Board of Governors, including the requested access to additional locations and information, have so far not been successful.

The Hungarian Government continues to support the Director General's efforts to maintain the continuity of the Agency's safeguards over the declared nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to carry out consultations with it aiming at the full implementation of all the relevant resolutions. We expect the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its Treaty obligations without any preconditions and to respond favourably to repeated appeals by the world community to provide full transparency of all its nuclear activities. We believe that such developments would contribute, not only to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to easing tensions and improving security in the East Asian region, but also to the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself.

Strenuous efforts should lead - in the not-too-distant future, we hope - to a new international agreement on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions. The cut-off of the production of all weapon-grade fissile materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons or other explosive devices, which has been discussed for many years, should also be achieved soon. Such developments, as well as the expected release of the fissionable material from dismantled nuclear weapons and the ever-growing amount of plutonium from the ongoing reprocessing of spent civilian fuel, require an effective international verification mechanism.

In our view, the Agency's professional and technical knowledge and the experience it has accumulated during the last 25 years in the field of verification-related safeguards activity are of great value to the world community. When searching for real solutions to the emerging new verification tasks of a nuclear non-proliferation nature, such values should be properly and fully utilized.

The Hungarian Government appreciates the Agency's work in providing safety-related technical assistance to Eastern and Central European countries. Its programme related to the safety of water-cooled and moderated reactor plants is truly of great importance to the safety-enhancement programme of our own nuclear power plant in Hungary. At the same time, taking into account the internationally recognized good operational-safety record of that nuclear-power plant, the experience and knowledge of the Hungarian institutions could well be utilized in international efforts aimed at enhancing the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.

We also commend and support the Agency's activity on strengthening and improving the legal basis of nuclear safety, including efforts to conclude the preparatory work on a convention on nuclear safety, which is to be adopted at a diplomatic conference in 1994.

Being at the same time a recipient and a donor country, Hungary attaches great importance to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For the time being, our country is receiving technical assistance in matters of such fundamental importance for the Hungarian nuclear industry as the evaluation of the earthquake resistance of our nuclear power plant and the implementation of our long-term complex strategy for the management and final disposal of radioactive wastes. On the other hand, the Hungarian nuclear facilities are open, through the IAEA's training and fellowship programme, to representatives from developing countries in order to share with them

knowledge and experience in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Our nuclear power plant continues to have great economic, technical and social impact on the whole country, as almost one half of Hungary's total net electricity production is generated there. Ten years ago, Hungary received significant assistance from the IAEA to develop the required technical, scientific and operational know-how necessary for safe nuclear-power production. Since then, the Agency and its internationally recognized experience have continued to be the most important professional source we can rely on in realizing our peaceful nuclear programme.

Mr. SHERBAK (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Russian Federation would like to join the other delegations which have already expressed their support for the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1992. While commending what is being done by the Agency, we associate its success particularly with what has been done by Mr. Hans Blix, who, as Director General of the IAEA, has already proved himself to be a skilful organizer and an experienced administrator. Russia supported the recommendation of the Board of Governors to appoint him to this responsible and important post for an additional four-year term. We wish him every possible success in his further work.

The world stepped from the cold war into a new era. Partnership is now replacing confrontation. The quest for political solutions is becoming more and more consolidated as the only acceptable way of resolving both new and old conflicts. There are increasing possibilities for constructive cooperation between States in guaranteeing security and in resolving economic, scientific and technological problems. There has been a tangible increase in the role of, and practical opportunities available to, international organizations, and, first and foremost, organizations such as the IAEA. The Agency, quite justifiably, is in the forefront of those who are seeking to resolve the general problems facing mankind in satisfying its growing energy needs and at the same time to provide safeguards to ensure that these efforts, including international cooperation, are directed to peaceful purposes.

The focal point in the whole range of nuclear problems facing the human race is the finding of means to further strengthen the international regime relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of paramount importance here is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty has proved its effectiveness and efficacy in the reduction of nuclear weapons and is having a positive impact on political stability in the world.

We are convinced that those participating in the Second Review Conference on the Treaty, to be held in 1995, will take the historic decision to extend it for an indefinite period. Russia will do everything it can to convert the Treaty into a genuinely universal international legal document, and it is confident that the Agency will make a noteworthy contribution to constructively preparing for this meeting.

We welcome the growing number of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly Armenia, Belarus and other countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that have recently acceded to the Treaty. We hope that other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, first and foremost Kazakhstan and Ukraine, will soon accede to the NPT and place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

On the other hand, I must note the Treaty's recent tribulations. The world community was deeply concerned by the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That decision has now been suspended, which is a step in the right direction. It is important that a complete review of the decision follow and that everything be done to enable the Agency to exercise full supervisory functions under the NPT, as outlined in the current safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA.

Radical changes on the international scene and growing trust between the nuclear States has made it possible not only to seek agreement on considerable reductions in nuclear weapons, but also to take qualitatively new steps in that direction.

Russia has been and remains committed to the goal of banning nuclear-weapon tests. We are pleased that the Conference on Disarmament has at last reached agreement on a decision in principle to commence multilateral talks on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Russia has been listening very carefully to new ideas put forward at this session concerning the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Many of these are in basic accord with the Russian position. We propose the commencement of focused talks at the Conference on Disarmament with a view to drafting a multilateral agreement on the supervised cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We consider that in the context of such an agreement all nuclear-weapon States would have to agree to place weapons-grade materials resulting from the destruction of the eliminated nuclear weapons under international control

under the auspices of the IAEA. In the interests of transparency, Russia is prepared to exchange information in accordance with what has already been agreed concerning the quantities of materials and the facilities in which they are stored. We are certain that agreement on these matters would make a great contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

In Russia, we no longer manufacture weapons-grade uranium; a programme to cease production of weapons-grade plutonium is now under way.

An outstanding feature of our new era is the real progress that has been achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament. Tens of thousands of warheads are now scheduled for dismantlement, and the fissionable material thus generated will amount to hundreds of tonnes. Without underestimating the importance of international supervision of the storage of nuclear materials, we think it important that such materials be used effectively, for constructive purposes. We in our country see tremendous potential in the use of such materials to further the achievement of the following priority tasks: nuclear disarmament and conversion; improving the safety of nuclear-power plants; solving ecological problems; and supporting economic reform.

Russia attaches special significance to the Agency's efforts to enhance further its supervisory functions and its safeguards system. IAEA supervision is an effective international confidence-building measure, and can provide stable conditions for the development of cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It is important for the IAEA to enjoy the unwavering support of the international community in that endeavour. For our part, we shall continue consistently to favour continued enhancement of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, including enabling the Agency to carry out unannounced inspections.

Russia has been actively cooperating with the Agency in another important sphere of activity: nuclear power. The future of nuclear power in Russia must be viewed in the context of our overall energy policy, which is currently aligned with the new economic conditions in our country.

The Russian Federation also attaches great importance to promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, particularly with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. As members know, the Russian Federation has been working under the Minsk Agreement to ensure safe management and international legal regulation of existing peaceful nuclear facilities in Russia and in other States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We are particularly interested in the proposal to merge those efforts with similar IAEA efforts

in the Commonwealth countries; here, in our view, the Agency could serve as coordinator.

The success of multilateral cooperation between the IAEA, Russia and the new States of the Commonwealth of Independent States could be based on a common understanding by Commonwealth States of the economic significance of the use of nuclear energy, on a wish to cooperate in enhancing the safety of nuclear power, and on an awareness of their responsibility to the international community with respect to resolving problems relating to nuclear power, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the environment, and nuclear and radiological safety.

Like last year, we note with satisfaction that the IAEA has successfully contended with its responsibilities in the fields of providing safeguards, promoting the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, and furnishing technical assistance. I reaffirm that Russia will continue fully to support this important and authoritative international agency in all areas of its activities.

Mr. MARUYAMA (Japan): First of all, I would like to congratulate Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on his reappointment. I would like also to express my delegation's appreciation for the statement Mr. Blix made this morning, in which he explained the major activities of the Agency.

In our view, the draft resolution before the Assembly, of which Japan is a sponsor, reflects concisely and in a balanced manner the basic tasks of the Agency as well as the main issues currently pending. As the preambular part describes well, safeguards and nuclear safety are essential for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also appropriate to mention that developing countries have special needs for technical assistance. The individual priority areas are identified, in accordance with the tradition of the Agency, in the form of General Conference resolutions. The operative part of the draft resolution highlights some of the current issues.

I should like to take this opportunity to state our position briefly on some points in connection with the draft resolution.

First, on safety issues, my delegation notes with satisfaction that the Agency provided, in a very timely fashion, safety assistance for the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We attach importance to the drafting work, organized by the Agency, for a nuclear-safety convention, which is expected to enhance the level of nuclear safety world-wide. I also wish to express our concern over Russia's ocean dumping of

radioactive waste. My delegation looks forward to the Agency's contribution to tackling this problem.

Secondly, on safeguards, we underline the Agency's effort to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. In particular, the recent cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deserve special attention. The very credibility of the safeguards system is at stake. I reiterate my Government's firm support and appreciation for the Agency's strenuous and painstaking efforts in this regard. My Government, together with many others, strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to implement fully the safeguards agreement with the Agency and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Thirdly, as to technical assistance, it is my Government's established policy to promote cooperation with developing countries. The nuclear field is no exception.

To conclude, my delegation wishes to express its expectation and sincere hope that the Agency will meet the challenges it faces today and that it will continue to play a significant role in the important field of furthering the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It gives me pleasure to welcome Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to congratulate him both on his re-election and on the Agency's achievements over the past year. Those achievements bear witness to the important and enhanced role the Agency plays in assisting the international community to deal with the nuclear threat and, in making it possible for all countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The international order continues to undergo changes and developments that follow upon one another and provide propitious opportunities for promoting nuclear-disarmament efforts and enhancing international peace and security. There is no doubt that the International Atomic Energy Agency, which must continue to assume more and more responsibilities, will take advantage of the positive aspects of those international developments while warding off any negative elements which may be involved.

With the review and extension conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) pending, we must redouble our efforts at the international level to ensure the

universality of the Treaty. We must ensure the commitment to renouncing the nuclear option by those States that have not yet acceded to the NPT. There can be no doubt that applying the Agency's safeguards in the case of those States is an essential prerequisite of confidence-building and the containment of the tensions that arise from the nuclear-arms race.

Egypt welcomes South Africa's openly declared renunciation of the nuclear option and its readiness to accept IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. This constructive development in South Africa's stance on the issue has gone hand in hand with progress now being made towards a comprehensive political settlement and the dismantling of the apartheid regime, developments which will ultimately lead to South Africa's reintegration into the African and international communities.

This gives rise to hope that similar progress may be achieved in the Middle East where efforts towards a political settlement are beginning to bear fruit. In this connection, Egypt wishes to state that political progress must be accompanied, if not preceded, by similar progress towards a commitment by all States of the region to renounce the option of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. This will be achieved only through accession by all States of the region to the NPT or through the application of the IAEA safeguards to all such States, without exception, as a prelude to their accession to the Treaty. Undoubtedly, this will have a direct effect on the promotion of mutual confidence and will strengthen the efforts now being deployed towards the establishment of peace.

Egypt urges all States of the region to respect the resolution adopted by General Conference of the Agency on 1 October last year regarding the application of the safeguards regime in the Middle East. I take this opportunity to express Egypt's deep appreciation of the Agency's role in this context, a role which will continue to receive our support.

I also wish to express Egypt's recognition of the Agency's invaluable role in advising the African experts engaged in the drafting of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa at their last meeting in Harare. Egypt hopes that the treaty will be adopted at the next session of the General Assembly.

While such positive developments may give rise to hope, there are other international developments that continue to remind us of the perils of nuclear proliferation and of the need to strengthen the NPT regime without delay, as well as the need to remedy its shortcomings. Reasons for optimism include the Conference on

Disarmament's decision last August to give its Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty. Egypt hopes that nuclear tests, be they open or clandestine, will come to a complete halt. There can be no doubt that the Agency will play a leading role in providing the necessary technical assistance and advice to the Conference, both in the areas of reviewing adherence to the Convention and of reviewing subsequent implementation of its provisions. The approaching NPT Review Conference provides us with an opportunity to remedy the current shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime in order to encourage the Treaty's continuance in force and to dispel any fears on the part of Member States that have renounced the nuclear option and yet continue to feel threatened by the very weapons they have renounced.

We call upon all the States that have not done so yet, to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its universality and the guarantees it provides to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them are likely to lead to the realization of its

objectives. We also call upon the States parties to the Treaty to continue to respect their commitments and to strictly abide by them.

In recent years, we have clearly seen that the NPT regime with which the Agency is entrusted needs to be improved and strengthened in order to ensure that the Agency's tasks are seriously conducted. My delegation pays tribute to the Agency's endeavours in this respect, although, in the final analysis, it is the will of the international community which can make it possible to extend and strengthen provision of the Agency's services to all without discrimination.

Finally, I wish to conclude by voicing the hope that the Agency will continue to make further achievements and will receive from Member States their full support and sufficient resources that would enable it to discharge its weighty tasks.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.
